Two key features of the postwar Japanese economy are the rapid economic growth during the 1960's and early 70's and the decline in labor supply during the rapid growth period. Taking the capital stock destruction and total factor productivity (TFP) as given, a standard neoclassical optimal growth model can account for the growth patterns of postwar Japanese capital stock, output, consumption, and investment. The decline in labor during the rapid growth period can be attributed to an income effect that occurs as household consumption rises above its subsistence level in this period.
Introduction
Two key features of the postwar Japanese economy are the rapid economic growth during the 1960s and early 70s and the decline in labor supply during the rapid growth period. The aim of this paper is to quantitatively account for these features with a standard neoclassical optimal growth model. The main …n d i n g s are that, taking total factor productivity (TFP) and the capital destruction as exogenous, the model can account for the postwar Japanese growth patterns of capital stock, output, consumption, and investment and that the decline in labor can be attributed to the strong income e¤ects caused by the subsistence consumption in this period.
The model consists of an in…nitely lived representative household and a …r m with constant returns to scale production technology. I take the capital destruction and TFP as given and compare the time paths of key variables generated by the model to data over the 1952-2000 period. The quantitative method directly follows Uhlig (2003) , which …n d s that the standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to the U.S. economy can account for the features of the …l t e r e d cyclical U.S. data, but does a poor job in accounting for the non…l t e r e d growth patterns. I show that the model calibrated to the Japanese economy does well in accounting for the Japanese postwar growth facts.
Several related studies show that TFP is important in accounting for the postwar Japanese growth within the neoclassical framework. Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu, and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006, 2007) and Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006) show that the actual TFP growth in a standard growth model can generate savings rates that are close to those found in the Japanese data of 1956-2000 1 . Using a two-sector model, Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2008) show that the TFP growth in the non-agricultural sector is important in accounting for the rapid growth in Japanese output and the fall of agricultural employment share with a two-sector model. claim that the di¤usion of research and development from the U.S. is a key driver of the Japanese medium term TFP ‡u c t u a t i o n and business cycles. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) focus on the 1990s and show that Japan's "lost decade" was caused by a TFP growth slow down and reduction in legal working hours. Most of these studies use deterministic models, whereas this paper uses a stochastic model. Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu, and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006) show that the …t of a stochastic model with non-changing expectations to data is less accurate than that of a deterministic model. I show that both a stochastic model with 1 rational expectations and a deterministic model generate time-paths in key macroeconomic variables reasonably similar to the data.
There also exist related studies on the decline in labor supply during the rapid growth period. Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) show that in the major OECD countries, labor income taxes can account for a signi…cant fraction of the decline in labor supply over the past …f t y years. I show that labor income tax is not the main driving force of the labor decline in Japan. Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006) show that exogenous changes in the family scale, which a¤ect the utility weights between consumption and leisure, can account for the decline in the Japanese labor supply during the rapid growth period. Instead of relying on these additional shocks, I show that taking only capital destruction and TFP as given, the neoclassical growth model with StoneGeary preferences-which depends on the subsistence consumption level-can quantitatively account for the decline in labor.
Stone-Geary preferences have been used in related growth and development literature. Christiano (1988) and King and Rebelo (1993) point out that a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to the Japanese economy, taking capital destruction as given, counterfactually predicts rapid capital stock accumulation immediately after WWII. They show that a one-sector model with Stone-Geary preferences and inelastic labor supply can account for the delay in capital stock accumulation since the subsistence consumption level encourages agents to increase their consumption rather than to invest during the early periods of recovery. In order to address the role of the agriculture sector in economic development, Hayashi and Prescott (2008) , Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2008) and Matsuyama (1992) use a variant of Stone-Geary preferences that exclusively depends on the subsistence consumption of agricultural goods in a two-sector model with agricultural and manufactured goods. In this setting, Engel's law holds due to the non-homotheticity between agricultural and manufactured goods. In this paper I use a variant of Stone-Geary preferences that depends on subsistence consumption of the single consumption good with endogenous labor. Ohanian, Ra¤o and Rogerson (2008) also introduce Stone Geary preferences where subsistence consumption only plays a limiting role in accounting for labor decline in OECD countries. I show that the model can account for the decline in labor in Japan during the rapid growth period through the strong income e¤ects on leisure caused by the non-homotheticity between consumption and leisure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical regularities of the Japanese economy. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 explains the quantitative method. Section 5 presents the quantitative results. In section 6, I conduct a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper. The …g u r e shows that there was rapid capital accumulation and growth in output, consumption, and investment during the 1960s and early 70s. This growth seems to have slowed down after the oil shock of the mid-1970s. An interesting fact is that the rapid growth did not occur immediately after the war but a decade later. Furthermore, labor was constantly falling during the rapid growth period. A model of the postwar Japanese economy must be able to account for these key facts. In this section, I further document the growth paths of these variables that are to be accounted for by the model. Table 1 presents the growth accounting results for Japan by decade. This growth accounting is based on the following Cobb-Douglas production function
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where output per adult Y t is the Gross National Product (GNP) divided by the working age population, i.e., the number of people aged 20-69; capital stock per adult K t includes the total capital stock 4 held both in Japan and abroad by domestic residents and inventory stock; labor input per adult L t is the number of people employed per adult times the average weekly hours worked per worker; capital share is set equal to 0:362 following Hayashi and Prescott (2002) ; and A t is the non-detrended TFP, also known as Solow residuals. The analysis starts from 1952, which is when the occupation by the allied powers ended. In the 1950s, the economy was growing at an average rate of 7:0%. A textbook explanation for this fast growth in Japan would be that the destruction of capital stock during the war created a high marginal product 4 Hayashi and Prescott (2002) abstract government owned capital stock from their analysis. I add government capital stock in order to assess the growth of total capital stock. However, for simplicity, I do not impute the ‡o w return on government capital assuming that it is not productive. The results for other variables are not sensitive to the di¤erence in the de…nition of capital stock. of capital and led to rapid capital accumulation. However, the output growth peaked not in the 1950s, but in the 1960s at 7:7%. Capital stock started to grow rapidly during the 1960s. After the mid-1970s, the economic growth slowed down, but not monotonically. During the 1980s-also known as the bubble economy period-the average growth rate was slightly above 3% and almost the same as in the 1970s, while the growth rate fell below 1% during the 1990s. A common perception is that the bubble economy was led by an overheated investment. However, the growth accounting shows that TFP was actually growing in a signi…cantly faster rate than in the 1970s.
An interesting feature of the postwar Japanese economy is the secular decline in labor since the 1960s. The decline in labor is especially outstanding from the 1960s to the early 70s; where the 1975 level is 30% below the 1960 level. It turns out that the main challenge of the theory is to explain this pattern of labor. Table 2 presents the evolution of the GNP shares. The demand side of the economy is divided into consumption and investment. The table shows that the consumption share of the GNP was higher in the early than in the late periods, while a rapid investment growth took place in the 1960s. Consumption consists of private consumption C Pt and government consumption C Gt . For simplicity, I combine them together and treat them as total consumption 5 . Investment consists of gross domestic capital formation I Dt and the current account CA t . Gross domestic capital formation includes both private and government investment as well as changes in inventories. Inventory stocks are included in capital stock. The current account is included in investment because total capital stock includes capital stock owned abroad 6 . In short, the resource constraint is
GNP Component Shares
In the 1950s, both the private and government consumption shares had peaked while domestic investment and the current account were at their lowest. Domestic investment grew rapidly in the 1960s and peaked in the 1970s, which indicates the rapid capital accumulation during these periods. The current account improved dramatically in the 1980s and stayed high during the 1990s. However, the share of the current account on the total GNP is not large and does not seem to be a major source of growth 7 . The share of both private and government consumption fell in the 1960s, re ‡ecting the rapid increase in investment. The private consumption share fell further in the 1970s and grew back in the 1980s. The government consumption share grew back in the 1970s and stayed roughly constant.
Trend and TFP Shocks
In a standard neoclassical growth model, TFP consists of a trend component and a transitory component. Balanced growth is assumed such that the trend component is constant. In order to incorporate the concept of balanced growth into the analysis, I alter the production technology from (1) to
where z t is the detrended TFP and X t is the world labor augmenting technical progress. Obviously the Solow residual A t in (1) is equal to z t X 1 t in (2). The world technical progress is assumed to follow the process
where is the constant growth rate which I assume to be 2%
8 . This implies that in the long run, Japan grows at the same rate as the world frontier. According to the neoclassical growth theory, all the variables-except for laborshould grow at this trend rate in the long run. In order to make the system stationary, all the growing variables are divided by X t . Figure 2 presents the long run per adult output series in log scales linearly detrended by 2% and normalizing at 1905 = 0. This shows that Japan's economy was in a steady state before the war 9 and seems to have been growing towards a new steady state following the war. The sudden drop in output immediately after the war can be attributed to the capital destruction that occurred. However, a temporary loss of capital stock neither a¤ects the steady state level of capital nor the output. Thus, I assume that the steady state level of z increased, i.e., the balanced growth path shifted upwards. A possible explanation of the increase in the steady state detrended TFP z is the removal of a barrier to technology adoption as suggested by Parente and Prescott (1994) 10 . I conjecture that the postwar U.S. occupation reduced the technological barrier in Japan. Hayashi and Prescott (2008) claim that the low productivity level prior to WWII can be explained by the barrier to labor mobility that caused a misallocation of labor by tying workers to the less productive agriculture sector rather than allowing them to move to the more 9 Saijo (2008) studies the interwar Japanese economy with the business cycle accounting method, using 2:1% as the per adult output trend growth rate. 10 Parente and Prescott (1994) consider gradual reductions of barriers with multiple shifts in balance growth paths whereas I assume that there is a one-shot reduction in the barrier associated with a single shift in the balanced growth path. It is convenient to assume that there was a one-shot shift of the balance growth path after the war since we can evaluate all variables as deviations from the new steady state.
productive manufacturing sector. The removal of this barrier can also explain the shift in the balanced growth path. Figure 3 presents the detrended postwar TFP and GNP normalized at 1989 = 0. There is a strong positive correlation between the TFP and GNP growths. The transition of TFP to its new steady state level was not instantaneous but gradual. Several related studies suggest the source of the gradual postwar Japanese TFP growth. Eaton and Kortum (1997) claim that a set of current leading economies-including Japan-experienced a gradual growth in postwar productivity because of a gradual adoption of the cutting edge technology. Gilchrist and Williams (2004) argue that the gradual growth in TFP came from the accumulation of vintage capital. Hayashi and Prescott (2008) argue that the gradual labor reallocation from the agricultural sector toward the more productive manufacturing sector after the removal of the barrier to labor mobility led to a gradual growth in the aggregate TFP. Instead of modeling the source of detrended TFP growth, I take it as exogenous in this paper. Once technology reaches the balanced growth path, it will grow on average at the same rate as the frontier. The convergence of the Japanese detrended TFP to its new steady state is not necessarily equivalent to its convergence to the world-leading productivity level. There might be a gap between the detrended steady state productivity in Japan and the frontier due to, for instance, a remaining barrier to the di¤usion of new ideas. The Penn World Tables 6.1 data implies that the Japanese TFP level was 83% of the U.S. level in 1989. This gap seems to be roughly persistent throughout the 80s and 90s.
Labor Decline
One key feature of the postwar Japanese economy is the decline in labor supply during the rapid growth period. Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) show that postwar changes in hours across OECD countries translate into large and trending labor wedges t de…ned as the wedges between the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption and the marginal product of labor in the labor …r s t order condition:
The dotted line in Figure 4 plots t computed using Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption and leisure, which is commonly used in the macroeconomic literature, following their speci…cation 11 . This shows that the model implies rapid growth in labor wedges during the 1960s and early 70s. (2008) shows that in major OECD countries, a large part of 11 Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) use a log utility function which is a special case of Cobb-Douglas preferences. The labor …r s t order conditions are identical between the special case and the general form. postwar labor wedges can be accounted for by labor income taxes. The solid line with "x"s in Figure 4 plots the Japanese labor income tax rate data 12 normalized at 1989 = 0. If labor wedges can fully be accounted for by labor income taxes, t = tax must hold for every period and thus, the two lines should overlap each other. In Japan, there was a slight increase in the labor income tax during the 1960s and early 70s. However, the increased labor income tax alone cannot fully account for the increase in labor wedges during the rapid growth period. Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006) show that the decline in family sizes in Japan can account for the decline in labor through 1960-2000. In their life-cycle model, the representative family's utility weight on leisure relative to average consumption increases as the family size shrinks. Thus, the shift in family size, which a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption, is observationally equivalent to the labor wedges 13 . In this paper, instead of introducing shocks that appear in the labor …r s t order condition, I show that the model with Stone-Geary preferences can account for the labor decline in Japan during the rapid growth period through the strong income e¤ects generated from the TFP growth and intratemporal non-homotheticity in consumption and leisure. The solid line in Figure 4 plots interesting, I focus on the constant decline in labor during the rapid growth period.
Model
In this section, I describe the model used to analyze the Japanese economy. The foundation of the model is a standard stochastic neoclassical growth model. The model consists of an in…nitely lived representative household that has preference over consumption and leisure and a …r m that uses constant returns to scale technology to convert capital stock and labor into a single …n a l good.
Household
The following equation represents the manner in which the household maximizes its lifetime utility:
where is the subjective discount rate such that 0 < <1, c t is the detrended per adult consumption, and l t is the labor supply, which is the fraction of the total hours allocated for work 14 . For the functional form of the periodical preference function u( ), I consider two cases;
where i = CD;SG stands for the Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary preference cases, respectively. Cobb-Douglas preferences, which are widely used in the macro literature, do not depend on the subsistence consumption c whereas 14 In speci…c,
where E t is the number of people employed, N t is the adult population, and H t is the average weekly hours worked per worker. I assume that the maximum number of hours available for working is 16 hours per day.
Stone-Geary preferences do. That is,
Cobb-Douglas preferences Stone-Geary preferences :
This preference function is consistent with the balanced growth since the subsistence consumption is de…ned as a fraction of the detrended steady state consumption c. The preference function (5) is slightly di¤erent from the one used in Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) since it includes leisure as an argument. Ohanian, Ra¤o and Rogerson (2008) use a similar preference setting with a modest level of subsistence consumption. Their preference setting is consistent with balanced growth asymptotically as consumption grows larger compared to c whereas mine is globally consistent with balanced growth. It turns out that this modi…cation brings several interesting implications on the labor supply, which is discussed in the following section. The weight the household assigns to consumption i takes values between 0 and 1 for both the preference cases.
The household maximizes (4) subject to the budget constraint
and the capital law of motion
where i t , w t , and r t are detrended per adult investment, real wage, and real return on capital, respectively. For simplicity, I assume that the population growth rate n is constant and de…ne the constant growth trend =(1+ )(1+ n).
Firm
The detrended …r m 's problem is
where y t is the detrended per adult output. The output is de…ned by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Shock Process
Detrended TFP shocks are assumed to follow the process detailed below:
As mentioned above, I assume that there was a one-time upward shift in the balance growth path after the war. Therefore, the gap between the initial TFP and the new steady state shown in Figure 2 does not re ‡ect a drop in the technological level, but can be attributed to the abovementioned rare event.
An important assumption is that the agents knew what the initial TFP was relative to the new steady state. As documented in studies of the Japanese interwar period such as Hayashi and Prescott (2008) and Saijo (2008) , the Japanese economy was in a lower steady state during the interwar period, when agents should have had no idea about the postwar growth. However, the postwar U.S. occupation exposed the Japanese to the cutting edge technology, which gave them a fair idea regarding where the current technology frontier was. Due to the postwar reforms during the occupation period, 1945-1951, it is not so unrealistic to assume that in 1952, the Japanese agents expected their productivity level to eventually catch up with that of their U.S. counterparts. First, the land reform that eliminated landlordism caused labor reallocation from the agriculture to the manufacturing sector, which was analogous to removing the barrier to labor mobility à la Hayashi and Prescott (2008) . Second, the Anti-monopoly law in 1947 following the dissolution of zaibatsu increased competition 15 . Third, the education reform making junior high school education compulsory and building national universities improved the potential level of human capital. These reforms all worked in a way to shift the economic structure, making it more suitable for adopting the cutting edge foreign technology. Thus, I argue that the agents in 1952 could anticipate the convergence to the U.S.
In order to pin down the detrended steady state level of TFP-given that U.S. was already on its balanced growth path-all they needed to know was the extent to which Japan would lag behind the U.S. in the long run. For example, if Japan's technology growth lags a decade behind that of the U.S., that is if Japan were to be at the technology level along its balance growth path that the U.S. was at ten years ago, the detrended steady state of TFP should be 20% below the U.S. level (2% 10 years), which is close to the actual TFP gap between U.S. and Japan in 1999, 17%.
Once the balanced growth path is shifted out, the AR1 process gives the expected TFP growth rate as ln z t ln z t 1 = ( z 1) ln z t 1 :
This means that the agents expected the TFP growth to slow down as it approached the steady state. As shown later, I estimate the parameter z from data over the 1952-2000 period. This implies that agents knew the average convergence rate of technology to the new steady state level. In section 6 I show that the key results are robust across di¤erent assumptions on expectations.
Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is, fc t ; l t ; k t+1 ; y t ; i t ; w t ; r t g 1 t=0 such that;
1. Households optimize given fw t ; r t g 1 t=0 and k 0 ; 2. Firm optimizes given fw t ; r t ; z t g 
Quantitative Method
In this section, I describe how parameter values are determined and how the model is solved. The simulation method directly follows Uhlig (2003) , which analyzes the postwar U.S. economy with a neoclassical growth model.
Parameter Va l ues
The parameter values are reported in Table 3 . The trend growth rate and the risk aversion parameter are set equal to 0:02 and 2, respectively. The subsistence consumption level c is set equal to 0:35 c, which is slightly lower than the initial consumption level 16 . The capital share is borrowed from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). The persistence parameter z and the standard deviation of the shocks z are estimated by a regression of the AR1 processes (6) over the 1952-2000 period. All other parameters are obtained by calibration using data over the 1985-1989 period. 
Consumption-Leisure Parameter 0:23
The depreciation rate is chosen so that the following steady state version of capital accumulation equation holds:
The discount factor is chosen so that the following steady state version of the capital Euler equation holds:
The consumption-leisure parameter i is chosen so that the steady state version of the labor …r s t order condition holds:
Data averages are used for steady state values of n; ; and l. 16 In order to maximize the e¤ect of the subsistence consumption, I choose the highest possible level according to my detrended model. Since consumption cannot be lower than the subsistence level, I set c at a slightly lower level than the consumption data in the initial period. This level of subsistence consumption is modest compared to those assumed in Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993)-c = 0:6 c and c = 0:9 y 0 , respectively. The discrepancy comes from the di¤erence in trend growth rates and steady state levels assumed in the models.
Simulation Method
In this paper I conduct two types of simulations with both Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary preferences; one with capital destruction as the only shock to the economy and the other with capital destruction and TFP shocks.
The quantitative analysis uses linearized equilibrium conditions. I follow the method of undetermined coe¢ cients as in Uhlig (1999) to compute the linear decision rules of the detrended endogenous variables. All the variables are de…ned as their log deviations from the steady state. The log deviation of a variable x t is de…ned as e x t = ln x t ln x:
The decision rules depend on state variables-capital stock and TFP. I set capital stock in the initial period equal to its actual level in 1952 17 . I substitute linearly detrended shocks into the linearized decision rules to compute the time path of the endogenous state variable-capital stock-for each period. Plugging the shocks and the simulated series of capital stock into the decision rules, I compute the time paths of the other endogenous variables. Finally, I plot the simulation results of capital, output, consumption, investment, and labor and visually compare them with the linearly detrended data normalized at 1989 = 0 18 .
Results
The simulation results are presented in Figures 5 and 6 where the dotted lines and solid lines represent the simulation results with Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary preferences, respectively. The results show that TFP is important in accounting for the growth pattern of capital, output, consumption, and investment while the subsistence consumption is important in explaining the decline in labor. Thus, with Stone-Geary preferences, the model with timevarying TFP can account for both the rapid economic growth and the labor decline during the 1960s and early 70s. 17 The detrended log deviation from steady state was 1:54 in the initial period. This implies that the capital stock in 1952 was exp( 1:54) = 0:214 relative to the new steady state, or in other words, 78:6% below the new steady state level. Existing literature such as Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006) use more moderate numbers since they assume the loss of capital stock as a drop from the prewar level, which is considerably lower than the new steady state. 18 Following Uhlig (2003), I also study the cyclical features of the economy over the 1952-2000 period. Results are presented in the appendix. Figure 5 shows the results for the counterfactual exercise that takes capital destruction during the war as exogenous while assuming a constant TFP throughout the whole period 19 . This corresponds to the analysis of King and Rebelo (1993) , which focuses on the transitional dynamics of postwar economies. Unlike their results, the model cannot account for the growth pattern of the postwar Japanese economy. 19 In my model, low capital stock relative to the new steady state in the initial period is a result of both the loss of capital stock during the war and the jump of steady state to a higher level. For simplicity, I will call this combined e¤ect the destruction of capital.
Capital Loss
In both the preference cases, capital stock, output, and consumption converges to the steady state too rapidly and investment is too high. The reason why the model fails to account for the delay of catch-up is because the initial marginal product of capital is too high due to the destruction of capital. This causes the model to predict high investment and rapid capital accumulation immediately after the war. Capital accumulation depends on the relative risk aversion parameter since, as discussed in King and Rebelo (1993) , this parameter governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that represents the willingness to smooth consumption over time by saving capital stock. However, there is no realistic value of with which the model can quantitatively account for the time path of capital stock in both the preference cases. Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) show that taking capital destruction as given, a standard neoclassical growth model with Stone-Geary preferences and inelastic labor supply can account for the delay in capital accumulation. The reason why my model that takes only capital destruction as exogenous cannot account for the delay in capital accumulation is because the labor supply is endogenously chosen. Since the subsistence consumption increases the relative importance of consumption in the early periods, the initial consumption will be higher. With inelastic labor supply, the higher initial consumption will force investment to be low during the early periods because of the resource constraint. On the other hand, with endogenous labor supply, the household substitutes consumption for leisure so that labor supply will be higher. Since this increases output, the resource constraint loosens and investment is not forced to be low. Thus, the model with a constant TFP cannot account for the delay in capital accumulation even with Stone-Geary preferences. Figure 6 shows the results of the simulation that adds the observed TFP shocks to the previous exercise. Taking TFP and the capital destruction as given, the model can account for the delay in capital accumulation remarkably well. The main di¤erence between the two preference cases is that the model with StoneGeary preferences can account for the decline in labor during the rapid growth period, whereas the model with Cobb-Douglas preferences cannot.
With Time-varying TFP
Both preference cases capture the postwar growth patterns of capital, output, consumption and investment. The low TFP during the early period more than o¤sets the e¤ect of the low capital stock on the marginal product of capital, which explains the delay in catch-up. Investment increases rapidly during the 1960s as TFP gradually grows and increases the return on capital.
The time path of output follows the TFP series both because of its direct e¤ect on production and indirect e¤ect through capital stock accumulation. The resultant …n d i n g that the model can account for the patterns of capital accumulation and output growth is consistent with the …n d i n g of Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu, and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006, 2007) and Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006) that the ‡u c t u a t i o n of postwar Japanese saving rates can be well accounted for by the changes in TFP, where they de…ne the saving rate as the ratio of net investment to net national product. respectively. With subsistence consumption, the preference function is nonhomothetic in consumption and leisure. The consumption growth during the rapid growth period increases the relative importance of leisure to consumption more with Stone-Geary preferences than with Cobb-Douglas preferences. Thus, the model with Stone-Geary preferences can account for the decline in labor during the rapid growth period with this strong income e¤ect on leisure 20 .
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I check the robustness of the results considering di¤erent expectation settings and values for key parameters. In each sensitivity analysis, I compare the results to the case in section 5.2, which is referred to as the benchmark case. Overall, the main results that state that TFP is important in accounting for the postwar Japanese growth and subsistence consumption is important in accounting for the labor decline during the rapid growth period are robust.
Expectations
In the benchmark case, the agents anticipate the future detrended TFP growth path using the estimated persistence parameter z . In other words, the agents 20 Given that the initial state is far below the balanced growth level, a global nonlinear solution method might be more appropriate than the linear method. I checked the results using the projection method with Chebychev polynomials. The results with Cobb-Douglas preferences turn out to be very similar to those in the paper while the results with StoneGeary preferences in the initial periods are somewhat sensitive to initial guesses and the choice of the subsistence consumption level. However, this does not overturn the main result that subsistence consumption can account for the decline in labor through strong income e¤ects. Since the focus of the paper is not to discuss the accuracy of the solution method, I use the linear method which is not a¤ected by the abovementioned issue.
correctly anticipate the future TFP growth on average. In this section, I consider other cases in which the agents have perfect foresight with regard to the future TFP and in which they erroneously expect that the future TFP will not change. The perfect foresight setting is used in related studies on the Japanese savings rate such as Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu, and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006, 2007) and Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006) . These studies use perfect foresight models since they can be solved using the shooting algorithm, which is a global nonlinear solution method. The solid line with "x"s in Figure 7 plots the results of the perfect foresight simulation with capital destruction and TFP shocks 21 . The results are quite similar to those of the benchmark case. The di¤erence is that there is more high frequency consumption smoothing than in the benchmark case since the agents have no uncertainty regarding the path of TFP in the future. In addition, in the early periods, the household enjoys more leisure at the expense of lower investment.
The solid line in Figure 7 plots the results of a simulation with z = 1, which means that the agents pessimistically believe that there will be no TFP growth and that the economy will stay at the same level. This corresponds to the non-changing expectations exercise in Chen, · Imrohoro¼ glu, and · Imrohoro¼ glu (2006) 22 . With non-changing expectations, labor is initially high and declines at a faster pace than in the data. This is because the negative income e¤ect on initial labor is stronger when the expected persistence of the TFP is higher. Moreover, since the household does not expect the TFP to grow, it does not delay investment but tries to restore capital stock faster than in the benchmark case. Output and consumption do not seem to depend much on the persistence parameter.
Parameters
In the benchmark model, preference parameters such as the relative risk aversion parameter and the subsistence consumption level c are chosen arbitrarily. In this section, I test the robustness of the benchmark results using di¤erent parameter values.
Following a wide range macroeconomic literature, the benchmark relative risk aversion parameter is set equal to 2. The solid line with "x"s in Figure  8 plots the results for the case of = 5. This parameter mainly a¤ects the degree of intertemporal smoothing of consumption and leisure. With a higher risk aversion parameter, the predicted consumption and labor path is ‡a t t e r and the predicted investment series is steeper since there is a stronger motive of intertemporal smoothing. Nonetheless, the overall results are not much di¤erent from those in the benchmark case.
The level of subsistence consumption in the benchmark case is set equal to c = 0:35c, i.e., 35 percent relative to the detrended steady state level of consumption, so that consumption never falls below the assumed subsistence 21 In this paper, I solve the system of linearized equilibrium conditions instead of using the shooting algorithm. 22 They assume that the agents expect a constant 2% TFP growth. In my model, the agents expect that the detrended TFP does not grow. Since I have de…ned the trend growth at 2%, the two are equivalent. level both in the simulation and in the data. If we assume a lower subsistence level, the results will be closer to the Cobb-Douglas case since this is simply the case in which subsistence consumption is equal to zero. The solid line in Figure 8 plots the results for the case of c = 0:1c. During the rapid growth period, the labor does not fall as much as in the benchmark case since the income e¤ect on leisure is weaker. 
Conclusion
In this paper I use a standard neoclassical growth model to quantitatively account for the key features of postwar Japanese economy; the rapid economic growth during the 1960s and early 70s and the decline in labor during the rapid growth period. I calibrate the model economy to the Japanese economy and taking the destruction of capital stock and TFP as given, conduct a stochastic simulation from 1952 to 2000. The model can quantitatively account for the time paths of capital, output, consumption, investment, and labor quite well for the whole simulation period, unlike the results for the U.S. as presented in Uhlig (2003) . I …n d that the TFP, along with the capital destruction, plays an important role in accounting for the delay of catch-up in the 1950s and the proceeding rapid growth until the mid-1970s, while the decline in labor during the rapid growth period can be attributed to the strong income e¤ects caused by the subsistence consumption during the rapid growth period.
In order to deepen our understanding of postwar Japanese growth, we need to study the nature of productivity growth. Eaton and Kortum (1997) show that the TFP growth can be accounted for by the adoption of technology from the frontier. The …n d i n g of Braun, Okada, and Sudou (2006) that the lagged di¤usion of U.S. R&D can account for the medium term productivity cycle in Japan is evidence of Japan importing U.S. technology. The question that remains unanswered is, "why did it take so long to adopt technology?" A model with learning-by-doing and human capital accumulation can perhaps answer this question.
A Va ri a bl e Utility We i g ht s Model
In this section, I introduce a model with variable consumption-leisure weights and show that the shifts in these weights work as labor wedges. This model is based on an assumption such that the utility weights on consumption and leisure depend on the consumption level. This preference assumption gives virtually the same results as the Stone-Geary preferences case.
Consider a household preference with variable consumption-leisure weights
The marginal rate of substitution is now
Therefore, the changes in t in (7) are observationally equivalent to the labor wedges in (3). The Euler equation will also be a¤ected since marginal utilities depend on t 23 when 6 = 1. In Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006), t is de…ned as the exogenously determined family size.
A simple regression shows that the utility weights are negatively correlated with consumption. The reduced form regression of demeaned utility weights on detrended consumption normalized at the steady state gives ln t ln = (ln c t ln c) + t ; where c t is the average consumption. The weights depend on the average consumption c t 24 simply for convenience so that the household does not internalize the e¤ect of consumption decisions on the utility weights. Since t converges to in the long run due to the mean reversion of consumption, the preference function is consistent with the balanced growth.
The results for the variable utility weight model are virtually the same as in the Stone-Geary preferences case. The mechanism is quite similar as well. When the household is poor, it values consumption more and leisure less, so labor is high in the early periods. As the household becomes richer, it values leisure higher and so, as the consumption approaches the steady state, the labor supply gradually falls.
B Cyclical Properties
In this section, I present the cyclical properties of the results from the benchmark simulations as in Uhlig (2003) . Following the real business cycle literature, the volatilities and cross-correlations are computed using the HoddrickPrescott …l t e r . 24 The household is the representative agent, so the average consumption must be the same as his consumption. dard deviations are in percentage scales. The numbers without the parentheses are computed from the simulation results and the numbers in the parentheses are computed from the corresponding data. The most obvious discrepancy between the simulation results and the data is that the ‡u c t u a t i o n in labor is too low in the simulation. Moreover, the model predicts a higher procyclicality of consumption and capital stock than that in the data. In addition, the model predicts even more volatility in output than that in the data. 1.00 data (-0.09) (-0.22) (0.14) (-0.14) (-0.63) (1.00) Braun, Esteban-Pretel, Okada, and Sudou (2006) compares the cyclical features of Japan and the U.S. over the 1960-2000 period and quantitatively accounts for them with a neoclassical model. Their model di¤ers from mine in several aspects. First, they use …l t e r e d TFP shocks, rescaled to match the output volatility in the model to that in the data, to compute second moments from the model following the real business cycle literature, whereas I use a non…l t e r e d TFP series to simulate the model and …l t e r the outcome. Second, they separate labor into employment and hours worked for both genders whereas I focus on the aggregate labor input. Third, they use quarterly data whereas I use annual data. Finally, they include labor income tax as an additional shock. Their model calibrated to the Japanese economy …t s the data better than my model mainly because the additional shock in the labor market increases the volatility of labor and reduces the high correlation of consumption with TFP.
